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Abstract
Whether or not there are gender differences in altruistic behaviour in Dictator Game
experiments has attracted considerable attention in recent years. Earlier studies found
women to be more altruistic than men. However, this conclusion has been challenged by
more recent accounts, which have argued that gender differences in altruistic behaviour
may be a peculiarity of student samples and may not extend to random samples. Here
we study gender differences in altruistic behaviour and, additionally, in expectations of
altruistic behaviour, in a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdworkers living in the
US. In Study 1, we report a mega-analysis of more than 3,500 observations and we show
that women are significantly more altruistic than men. In Study 2, we show that both
women and men expect women to be more altruistic than men.
Keywords: dictator game, gender differences, altruism, expectations.
1 Introduction
Are women more altruistic than men? Previous research suggests so. For example, in the US
in 1991, during a recession, women increased their philanthropic giving by 2.4 percent, while
men decreased theirs by over 20 percent (Mixer (1993)). It has been shown that women typi-
cally give more than men to charity (Breeze and Thornton (2006); Piper and Schnepf (2008);
Mesch et al. (2011)). Social role theorists have also argued that women are expected to be
communal and unselfish, while men are expected to be agentic and independent (Eagly (1987);
Williams and Best (1990); Eagly (2009)), and that these differential expectations affect work
performance (Heilman and Chen (2005); Heilman and Okimoto (2007)).
To explore gender differences in altruistic behaviour, experimental economists typically
turn to the aseptic setting of controlled laboratory experiments using the Dictator Game (DG).
In the DG one player acts in the role of dictator and the other one in the role of receiver.
Dictators are given a certain amount of money and are asked how much, if any, they want to
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give to the receiver. Receivers have no choice and only get what the dictators decide to give.
Since dictators have no incentives to give money, a payoff-maximising dictator would donate
nothing. Dictators’ donations are thus taken as a measure of individual’s general altruistic
tendencies (Brañas-Garza (2006, 2007); Charness and Gneezy (2008); Engel (2011); Franzen
and Pointner (2013); Peysakhovich et al. (2014); Rand et al. (2016)).
Several studies have found that, on average, women give more than men in DG experi-
ments (Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001); Boschini et al. (2014); Capraro andMarcelletti (2014);
Capraro et al. (2014); Capraro (2015); Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002); Dreber et al. (2013,
2014); Dufwenberg andMuren (2006); Eckel and Grossman (1998); Houser and Schunk (2009);
Kettner and Ceccato (2014); Rand et al. (2016). See Bolton and Katok (1995) for a null result,
although using an extrememly small sample). However, there are also critical exceptions. In
his meta-analysis of 616 DG experiments, Engel (2011) found that women are only marginally
significantly more altruistic than men. Interestingly, Cappelen et al (2015) and Carpenter et
al (2008) compared student samples to random samples and found gender differences in the
student samples but not in the random samples, which led them to conclude that gender differ-
ences in DG altruism, if existing, may be domain-specific.
Here we contribute to the aforementioned literature by exploring gender differences in al-
truistic behaviour among Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers living in the US. AMT is
an interesting platform to study gender differences in altruistic behaviour because AMT work-
ers, although less representative than national probability samples (e.g., Asians are overrepre-
sented and Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented), are more representative than student
samples (Berinsky et al. (2012); Paolacci and Chandler (2014); Shapiro et al. (2013)). More-
over, numerous experiments have shown that data gathered on AMT are of no less quality than
data gathered on the standard physical lab (Arechar et al. (2018); Horton et al. (2011); Mason
and Suri (2012); Paolacci et al. (2010); Paolacci and Chandler (2014)).
In Study 1, we analyse more than 3,500 previously collected DG donations, and we test
whether women are more altruistic than men. In Study 2, we collect new experimental data
with the intention to explore whether women are expected to be more altruistic than men or
not.
Understanding gender differences in expectations of altruistic behaviour is relevant because
people often make decisions based on their beliefs about others’ behaviour. Thus, a mismatch
between expectations and behaviour may create suboptimal outcomes. For example, in a family
context, the production of human capital for children requires both mothers’ and fathers’ inputs
(e.g., time for playing, reading to the child). If fathers expect mothers to be more willing to
spend time on producing health and skills for the child, fathers may invest less time in the
production of human capital than mothers. However, when fathers’ expectations do not match
with the actual behaviour of mothers, parental investment may result in suboptimal outcomes
for their children and, consequently, for the family as a whole.
Although social psychologists have repeatedly found that women are expected to be more
altruistic than men in a variety of contexts ((Eagly (1987, 2009); Heilman and Chen (2005);
Heilman and Okimoto (2007); Piliavin and Charng (1990); Williams and Best (1990)), this
question has been largely neglected by experimental economists. We are aware of a handful of
studies eliciting participants’ beliefs about the level of altruism (Aguiar et al. (2009); Dufwen-
berg and Gneezy (2000); Delavande and Zafar (2015); Capraro and Kuilder (2016)), but only
one of them looked at gender differences: Aguiar et al (2009), using a student sample, found
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that women are expected to be more altruistic than men, but only by other women.1
2 Study 1
2.1 Protocol
We analyse all DG donations that we collected on AMT in several experiments conducted
between 2013 and 2017 (d’Adda et al. (2017); Biziou-van Pol et al. (2015); Capraro et al.
(2014); Capraro and Kuilder (2016); Capraro and Sippel (2017); Rand et al. (2016)). In case
of multiple observations from the same participant (as determined by checking for multiple IP
addresses and TurkIDs), we keep only the first observation. All dictators passed two compre-
hension questions about the choice that would maximise their payoff and the choice that would
maximise the recipient’s payoff. We also include N = 457 observations reported in Study 2 of
the current work. Excluding these observations does not change our main findings.
2.2 Subject pool
A total of 3,583 participants (58.2% males, mean age = 32.55), living in the US at the time of
the experiments, recruited on AMT.
2.3 Results
In order to make data from different projects comparable, we first build a (quasi)continuous
variable representing the proportion of the endowment that dictators give to recipients (0 =
nothing, 1 = all). In the experiments reported in this mega-analysis, endowments were rather
small, either 10c or 20c. However, this is not problematic: the average proportion of the en-
dowment donated in our mega-analysis is 30.8%, which is in line with the proportion reported
in the meta-analysis conducted by Engel (2011), that is 28.3%. This provides another piece of
evidence that data gathered using small stakes on Amazon Mechanical Turk are of comparable
quality than those collected in standard ways (see also Amir et al. (2012)).
Coming to our main research question, a linear regression of donations on gender (0 =
male, 1 = female) shows that women give significantly more than men (coeff = 0.057, t=5.77, p
< 0.001). The analysis of distribution of donations confirms and strengthens these result. See
Figure 1a and Figure 1b. In line with the meta-analysis by Engel (2011), we find a virtually
bi-modal distribution of donations, with one main mode at giving nothing, and the other one at
giving half. However, if we analyse men and women in detail, we find that the main mode for
men is at giving nothing (45.7% give nothing, while only 36.1% give half); whereas the main
mode for women is at giving half (49.4% give half, while only 31.2% give nothing).
1Recently, Babcock et al (2017) looked at gender differences in expected contributions to the public good.
Although related, these results cannot be applied to our case, as the public goods game measures a behaviour
(cooperation) different from the one measured by the dictator game (altruism): DG altruists typically contribute
to the public good, but not the converse (Capraro et al. (2014)).
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Figure 1: Study 1: Distribution of donations by gender in mega-analysis (3,583 participants). Both
distributions are bimodal, concentrated in giving nothing and giving half. The mode for the male’s
distribution is to give nothing, while for the female’s is to give half. In sum, women tend to give more
than men.
3 Study 2
3.1 Protocol
Subjects were randomly divided between dictators and receivers. Dictators were given $0.20
and were asked to decide how much, if any, to give to the receiver. Receivers were asked to pre-
dict the donation that another dictator would make to another receiver in one of four between-
subjects treatments. Receivers would receive $0.20 reward for correct guesses (Capraro and
Kuilder (2016)). This procedure incentivises receivers to guess the modal donation. Moreover,
since they do not guess their own donation there is no opportunity to hedge (Brañas-Garza et al.
(2017)). The treatments were as follows. In the On treatments, receivers were shown the same
instructions given to dictators. Then they were asked to guess the dictator’s decision; the Omow
was identical to On with the only difference that receivers were informed that the dictator was
either a man or a woman; the Om was identical to On with the only difference that recipients
were informed that the dictator was a man; the Ow was identical to Om with the only difference
that receivers were informed that the dictator was a woman. We opted for conducting two base-
lines, On and Omow, so that, by comparing Om and Ow with Omow, separately, we can investigate
the effect of making one particular gender salient versus making both genders salient.
We refer to the Appendix for more details about the procedure and for the experimental
instructions.
3.2 Subject pool
A total of 987 subjects (55.9% males, mean age = 34.6), residents in the US at the time of the
experiment, recruited on AMT. We refer to the Appendix for details about how these subjects
were distributed across conditions.
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3.3 Results
In line with Engel’s meta-analysis (Engel (2011)), the distribution of dictators’ donations was
virtually bimodal, with one mode at donating nothing (43.5%) and the other one at donating
half (43.1%). The average donation was 27.3%. Also this was very close to that reported by
Engel (28.3%). Although, in our experiment, the endowment given to dictators was $0.20, in
what follows, data are normalised such that the donations correspond to 0-10.
As a preliminary step, we show that the gender effect on dictators’ donations found in
Study 1 is replicated in the current sample. Figure 2a and Figure 2b compare the distribution of
donations by men with the distribution of donations by women, and provides visual evidence
that women are more altruistic than men: giving nothing is the modal choice for males (49.6%
gave 0) while sharing equally is the modal choice for women (48.3% gave half). This gender
difference is reflected also on the mean donations (24.8% vs 30.3%, linear regression, coeff =
0.551, t = 2.20, p = 0.028). Thus, also in the current sample, women are more altruistic than
men.
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Figure 2: Study 2. Distribution of donations by gender (987 participants). As in Figure 1, both distri-
butions are bimodal. Women tend to give more than men.
Next, we analyse gender differences in expectations of altruistic behaviour. First of all, we
observe that treatments On and Omow report similar averages (2.79 and 3.16, linear regression,
p=0.243). Similarly, we do not find significant differences between Om [ Ow and Omow (p =
0.887). Thus, gender framed instructions do not change subjects’ expectations. Figures 3a, 3b
show the histograms for Om and Ow, respectively. While the main mode for expected behaviour
of men is 0 (giving nothing) the main mode for expected behaviour of women is 5 (giving half).
Average values reflect the same result: the mean expected altruism among men is 2.33, while
the mean expected altruism among women is 4.05 (coeff = 1.722, t = 5.51, p< 0.001). The top
part of Table 1 shows the relevant tests. Thus women are expected to be more altruistic than
men.2
2Using Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon non-parametric tests, we obtain the same conclusions.
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Figure 3: Study 2. Expected behaviour of men and women. When asked to guess dictator’s donation
knowing that the dictator is a man, the main mode of the guesses is 0. Conversely, when asked to guess
dictator’s donation knowing that the dictator is female, the main mode of the guesses is 5, half of the
endowment. Thus, women are expected to be more altruistic than men.
Then, we analyse whether both men and women expect women to be more altruistic than
men. This is indeed the case: women are perceived to be more altruistic than men both by men
(mean guesses: 2.04 vs 3.85; coeff = 1.808, t =4.11, p< 0.001) and by women (mean guesses:
2.69 vs 4.31; coeff = 1.619, t = 3.72, p < 0.001).
Table 1: Linear regressions
Coefficient t P-value
On vs Omow -0.380 -1.17 0.243
Om [ Ow vs Omow 0.040 0.14 0.887
Om vs On -0.848 -2.57 0.011
Ow vs On 0.874 2.76 0.006
Ow vs Om 1.722 5.51 0.000
Dw vs Dm 0.551 2.20 0.028
Note: Dm (Dw) refers to men (women) dictators.
Finally, we observe that, when recipients are asked to predict women’s behaviour, then
more women than men guess the correct mode (70.7% vs 54.1%, Fisher’s exact, p=0.071), but
when recipients are asked about men’s behaviour, then results trended, although not signifi-
cantly so, in the opposite direction: more men than women tend to guess the correct mode
(53.6% vs 38.2%, Fisher’s exact, p=0.104). Moreover, men are marginally significantly better
at guessing women’s modal choice (53% guessed it right) than women are at guessing men’s
modal choice (only 38% guessed it right; Fischer’s exact: p=0.079). Note that, in these anal-
yses, samples are very small (about 65 observations per condition), and this might explain the
lack of statistical significance, despite the relatively large effect sizes).
6
4 Conclusion
We studied gender differences in Dictator Game altruistic behaviour and expectations of altru-
istic behaviour on a large sample of US residents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT). We found that: (i) women are more altruistic than men and (ii) both women and men
expect women to be more altruistic than men.
Our first result is in line with and extend previous studies using student samples. This is
a non-trivial extension because AMT samples are more representative than student samples
but less representative than random samples (Berinsky et al. (2012); Paolacci and Chandler
(2014); Shapiro et al. (2013)), and, while previous research has found gender differences in
student samples, it has been suggested that gender differences in altruistic behaviour may not
extend to random samples (Cappelen et al. (2015); Carpenter et al. (2008)).
Our second result roughly confirms the only existing study we are aware of on the same
topic (Aguiar et al. (2009)), but with an important difference. While Aguiar et al. (2009),
using a student sample, found that women are expected to be more altruistic than men only by
other women, we found that, in our sample of AMT workers, women are expected to be more
altruistic than men by both women and men.
We have also found some evidence that each gender is better at predicting their own gen-
der’s behaviour, rather than the other gender’s. Moreover, men seems to be better than women
at predicting the other gender’s behaviour. However, all these results are only (close to)
marginally significant, partly due to the small sample size. Exploring accuracy of beliefs is
an interesting direction for future research.
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Details on Study 2
Experimental instructions
Participants were randomly divided between dictators and recipients. Recipients, in turn, were
randomly divided in four conditions. Below we report the instructions of all five conditions.
Dictators
Screen 1
You have been paired with another participant. The amount of money you can earn depends
only on your choice. You have been provisionally allocated 20c, while the other participant is
given nothing. You have to decide how much, if any, to transfer to the other participant. The
other participant has no choice, is REAL, and will really accept the amount of money you
decide to transfer. No deception is used. You will really get the amount of money you decide
to keep.
Screen 2
Now we will ask you two comprehension questions questions to ascertain that you un-
derstood the decision problem. If you fail to answer any of these questions, the survey will
automatically close without providing a completion code.
Screen 3
How much should you transfer to the other participant in order to maximize your income?
(Available answers: 0c, 2c, 4c, ... , 20c).
Screen 4
Howmuch should you transfer in order to maximize the other participant’s income? (Avail-
able answers: 0c, 2c, 4c, ... , 20c).
Screen 5
The comprehension questions are over. It is now time to make your real choice.
How much do you want to transfer to the other participant? (Available answers: 0c, 2c, 4c,
... , 20c).
4.0.1 Recipients in the neutral condition
Screen 1
Your role is to guess how a participant (PERSON A) will behave towards another partici-
pant (PERSON B). You will win 20c if you make the right guess. The screenshots below show
the instructions presented to Person A.
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Screen 2
This screen was a screenshot of Screen 1 shown to Dictators.
Screen 3
This screen was a screenshot of Screen 5 shown to Dictators, where we eliminated the
sentence ‘The comprehension questions are over’.
Screen 4
What amount do you believe Person A will give to Person B?
4.0.2 Recipients in the other conditions
Either male or female condition
This condition is identical to the neutral condition, with the only difference that Screen 1 is
replaced by the following screen:
Your role is to guess how a participant (PERSON A, who is either a male or a female)
will behave towards another participant (PERSON B). You will win 20c if you make the right
guess. The screenshots below show the instructions presented to Person A.
Male condition
This condition is identical to the neutral condition, with the only difference that Screen 1 is
replaced by the following screen:
Your role is to guess how a participant (PERSON A, who a male) will behave towards an-
other participant (PERSON B). You will win 20c if you make the right guess. The screenshots
below show the instructions presented to Person A.
Female condition
This condition is identical to the neutral condition, with the only difference that Screen 1 is
replaced by the following screen:
Your role is to guess how a participant (PERSON A, who a female) will behave towards an-
other participant (PERSON B). You will win 20c if you make the right guess. The screenshots
below show the instructions presented to Person A.
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Details about sample size and payment procedure
Since dictators were asked comprehension questions, while receivers were not, and since sub-
jects failing any comprehension question were automatically excluded from the survey, we had
fewer dictators (N = 457) than receivers (N = 530). This is not problematic for the analy-
sis, because we never compared dictators with receivers. As for the computation of receivers’
payoffs, since there is no one-to-one correspondence between dictators and receivers, to avoid
deception, we proceeded as follows: after the data were collected, receivers were sequentially
paired with a randomly selected dictator; in case a dictator had already been used to pay an-
other receiver, we paid the current receiver ‘out of our pocket’, and not using the donation of
that dictator, because that donation had already been used. This procedure is doable on Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk (because participants are matched only after the end of the experiment)
and allows us to avoid deception (because each dictator gets paired with one receiver, and each
receiver receives a real donation).
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